Private vs Public Expressions of Racial Prejudice

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The present research examined the different processes that guide judgments of single group members in private vs anticipated public contexts. In each of three experiments, pro-Black or anti-Black participants were informed in advance either that their judgments of a Black individual were completely confidential (Private Context) or that they would be discussing their judgments with the other persons in the room (Anticipated Public Context). Experiment 1 showed that judgments of the target were more consistent with racial attitudes in the anticipated public than in the private condition. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and, moreover, showed nearly identical effects regardless of whether participants’ attitudes were assessed by measures of modern vs “old-fashioned” racism. Experiment 3 again showed consistency between group attitudes and judgments of the target in anticipated public contexts, even when participants were given information about the likely “pro” or “anti” views of the audience and, hence, regardless of whether participants believed that the audience agreed with their own attitudes or not. Taken as a whole, results were consistent with a ‘bolstering’ framework first articulated in the cognitive dissonance domain (e.g., McGuire, 1964), which has shown that people become psychologically invested in their own positions when they anticipate debate with others, especially when their a priori commitment to their attitude is relatively high. The implications of the present results for theories of modern racism and the construct validity of the modern racism scale are discussed.

What people say, and what they do, often depends on whether their responses are made in relatively private or public settings. Psychologists have long been aware of this fact, and indeed entire disciplines within social psychology (e.g., conformity, impression management, accountability) rest on the assumption that the extent to which others in the immediate environment are privy to our actions

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can have a powerful effect on social behavior (Asch, 1956; Schlenker, Britt, & Pennington, in press; Tetlock, 1992).

Given the sensitivity of racial issues in our culture, the effects of varying private vs public contexts on social behavior should be especially pronounced when people are judging members of stereotyped groups. One might expect, therefore, a wealth of research to have been conducted on the role of judgmental context in moderating expressions of prejudice. Somewhat surprisingly, this is not the case. Instead, in the majority of experimental research, participants are typically told that their responses to the target are either completely confidential or even anonymous (cf. Hamilton & Sherman, 1994 for a recent review). The goal of the present research, therefore, was to gain further insight into the virtually unexplored processes that mediate responses to members of stereotyped groups in private vs anticipated public settings. In order to carry out these aims, we employed an operationalization of the private vs public variable that was similar to that used by Tetlock (1992; see also Zajonc, 1960), such that participants were informed in advance either that their judgments of a single Black person were confidential (private context) or that they would be discussing their judgments with the other participants in the room (anticipated public context).

It should be noted that other studies have, of course, examined the correspondence between individuals' attitudes toward minority groups as assessed in standard surveys (e.g., “Do you serve Chinese?”) and publicly observable reactions toward a single group member (e.g., LaPiere, 1934). To our knowledge, however, the present research represents the very first laboratory-based investigation in which participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which they judged a single Black individual in either a private or anticipated public setting. Although it obviously lacks the richness and realism of field studies, one advantage of the current paradigm is that it allows more precise examination of the role of private vs public contexts while allowing for the degree of control not possible in field investigations.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Previous research and theory (e.g., Tetlock, 1992) has identified at least three different processes that can potentially guide judgments in anticipated public contexts. First, anticipated public settings may produce a conformity effect, such that people formulate their responses so that they are consistent with the perceived views of the group and, hence, so that they may minimize conflict with these other persons (Asch, 1956). A second way of avoiding conflict is through a type of moderation effect, such that people shift their judgments to the middle of the rating scale (Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & Evenbeck, 1973). Third, anticipated public contexts may produce bolstering effects, in which people focus on their own attitudes and ideological positions in anticipation of defending themselves against possible criticisms from others (McGuire, 1964), an effect that has been demonstrated in several experiments conducted in the cognitive dissonance area (e.g., Greenwald, 1969; Jellison & Mills, 1969; Sears, Freedman, & O’Connor,
Thus, unlike the first two processes discussed above, this introduces the interesting possibility that people’s own attitudes may actually play a greater role in guiding thought and action in public contexts compared to more private settings. In the present research, this effect would manifest itself in terms of a stronger relation between attitudes toward Blacks as a whole and participants’ judgments of a single Black individual in the public compared to the private condition.

EXPERIMENT 1

In light of the paucity of research on private vs anticipated public contexts in the stereotyping domain, we conducted an exploratory study in which we assigned participants to conditions in which they were asked to form an impression of a single Black male in either a private or anticipated public setting. The main question concerned how individual differences in participants’ attitudes toward Blacks (assessed two months earlier) would mediate responses to the target across these two judgmental contexts. Before presenting the method and results from this study, it should be noted that the methodology of the private condition of this study was very similar to a recent study by Jackson, Sullivan, and Hodge (1993), who found no relation at all between group attitudes and judgments of a single Black individual. Thus, if their findings generalize to the present study, we should also find no consistency between participants’ attitudes toward Blacks and their judgments of the target in the private condition. However, our main concern was how this relation might change by informing participants that their judgments were not private at all, but rather, that they would be sharing their impressions with the other participants in the testing room.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 32 White undergraduates (13 males and 19 females) ranging in age from 18 to 24 who received course credit in return for their participation. The main variables included the judgmental context to which participants were assigned (Private vs Anticipated Public) and their overall attitudes toward Blacks.

Initial Testing Phase

Two months prior to the main study, participants completed a battery of questionnaires distributed during the first week of class; participants were informed that all of their responses were confidential. In one part of the questionnaire, participants were asked to complete McConahay’s (1986) modern racism scale, which asks participants to respond to a series of statements along a scale ranging from −2 to +2; responses were coded such that higher numbers indicate more favorable attitudes toward Blacks.1

1 There have recently been some theoretical debate as to the construct and predictive validity of the modern racism scale in methodological paradigms different from that employed in the present research (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). This issue shall be considered in more detail later in this paper.
Target Judgment Phase/Manipulation of Judgmental Context

Approximately 2 months after completing the personality inventory, participants were brought into the laboratory in groups of four to eight to participate in an ostensibly unrelated study. The experimenter in this phase was different from the person who administered the initial inventory. Upon entering the laboratory, participants were told initially that “we were interested in the processes by which people form impressions of other persons based on the information they receive about them.” Following these preliminary remarks, participants were randomly assigned to receive one of two different sets of written instructions. (Experimenter was blind to this assignment.) In the Private condition, participants were informed that all of their responses were confidential (i.e., that none of the other participants would have access to their ratings). In the anticipated public condition, participants were informed that:

We are also interested in the process by which people communicate their judgments and impressions to other persons. Therefore, after you have formed your impressions of this person, there will be a general discussion session with the other participants in the room today. During this discussion, each of you will have the opportunity to show others the information that you were given, as well as talk about the kinds of judgments you made about this person.

In reality, none of the participants in this condition actually discussed their judgments of the target with the other participants and in the debriefing all participants were reassured that all of their responses were, in fact, confidential.

Background information. Participants were then presented with a biographical sketch that the target person (who was male in all conditions) had supposedly filled out about his name, address, social security number, place of birth, current educational status, academic major, expected graduation date, citizenship status, gender, as well as his racial/ethnic background (which was checked “Black or African American” in all conditions). The target’s race was thus only one of a dozen or so pieces of incidental background information presented about the target person, and gave no indication that participants should either consider it or ignore this information in forming their impressions.

Behavioral description. After the background information sheet, participants were provided with a one-page description of the target person that had implications for two trait dimensions that had been shown by previous research (e.g., Devine, 1989) to be central to the stereotype about Blacks, namely, intelligence and aggressiveness. Information regarding his intelligence was presented in the form of information about the target’s GPA and general academic performance, which was moderately high in all cases. Information about his interpersonal assertiveness/aggressiveness was conveyed in a brief passage (adapted from a previous study by Srull & Wyer, 1980) which described some behaviors that could be interpreted as reflecting a moderate degree of assertiveness or aggression. The description read as follows:

It was Thursday morning. John got up a little earlier than his usual time, because he had remembered that he needed to get some work done before class. After his usual hot shower, John got dressed and sat down at his desk to try to do some reading. After working for a while, John looked up from his books to have another look at the letter that had been sitting on his desk. He had gotten a 3.5 again and made the Dean’s list for the 3rd semester in a row. His parents were really proud of him. If things went the way they had been going, it looked like he was going to get all A’s this semester, with maybe one B+. His accomplishments so far made him determined to keep it up and make the list again next semester. With a little luck, John would be able to get into that graduate program on the east coast that he had heard so much about. After his morning classes, John grabbed some lunch at the cafeteria. The place was a little crowded, but John found a table in the back and sat down. He thought about how much was looking forward to going home. John thought how nice it would be to eat
some real food instead of the tasteless stuff they served at school. Later on that day, John
needed to do a couple important errands in the city, but unfortunately his car started making
some noises. John thought it might be something pretty serious, and so he looked for a shop
that could fix it. When John brought the car in to the shop, he told the garage mechanic that
he would have to go somewhere else if he couldn’t fix his car that same day. While he was
waiting for the car to be fixed, John went to a store to buy some supplies that he had been
meaning to buy for a while. Afterwards, John picked up his car, did some more errands, and
drove back to his place in time for dinner.

Assessment of dependent variables. Participants reported their overall evaluation of the target along
a scale ranging from −5 (very unfavorable) to +5 (very favorable). Following this, they estimated the
degree to which the target possessed a number of specific trait dimensions. These judgments were
made along a scale that ranged from not at all (0) to extremely (10). One trait pertained to the target’s
overall likableness (likeable). Another cluster of traits referred to the specific stereotypic trait of
intelligence/academic performance (e.g., intelligent, bright) or hostility (aggressive, hostile). Particip-
ants also estimated how much they would like to meet John using a scale ranging from −5 (not at all)
to +5 (very much).

Free recall task. Following their impressions of the target, participants were asked to recall as much
information from the biographical sketch as they could. This task was included to test whether
participants had noticed the race of the target; two participants failed to do so and were excluded from
further analyses.2 Following this, participants were probed for suspiciousness, debriefed, and dis-
missed; seven participants indicated moderate suspiciousness and thus were excluded from the final
set of analyses as well.

Scoring. On a priori grounds, we were interested in three types of responses toward the target,
namely: (a) participants’ overall affective reaction to the target, (b) ratings of intelligence, and (c)
ratings of aggression. To this end, we formed three composites which represented each of these three
classes of reactions. Specifically, participants’ affective reaction to the target was based on an average
of their initial evaluation of the target, ratings of general likeableness, and their desire to meet John.
Perceptions of his intelligence were based on an average of the trait terms intellectual, bright,
successful, responsible, and ambitious. Finally, perceptions of his aggressiveness were based on an
average of two items directly related to this construct (aggressive, hostile) as well as two trait terms
which also represent more “mild” levels of interpersonal assertiveness (impolite, impatient). These
composites were coded such that higher numbers indicated more favorable impressions of the target.
As will be seen ahead, however, a very similar pattern of results arose for each of these three classes of
responses.3

Results

Results indicated that participants’ judgments of the target were more consis-
tent with their racial attitudes when he was judged in an anticipated public than in
a private setting. Consider first the private condition. Here, participants’ judg-

2 In this experiment as well as in the experiments to be reported ahead, we also conducted an
alternate set of analyses in which we included those participants who failed to correctly note the
target’s race in the free-recall task. The pattern of results was very similar, although in our research we
generally find stronger effects of our manipulation of private vs anticipated public contexts when we
use this more stringent exclusion criterion than when we do not.

3 In our later research (conducted with much larger sample sizes), principal component factor
analyses consistently reveal an intelligence and assertiveness/aggressiveness factor with eigenvalues
greater than 1.0. The specific items listed above are those that loaded highly (.50 or better) on one
factor but not the other. For the sake of continuity and to facilitate direct comparison across studies, we
used the identical judgmental composites throughout the research reported in this article.
ments of the target were not at all consistent with how they felt about Blacks as a whole, and this was true for all three classes of judgments. In fact, there was a non-significant tendency for participants in this condition to judge the target in a manner inconsistent with their attitudes toward Blacks, and this was true for participants’ overall affective reaction ($r = -.33$), ratings of aggressiveness ($r = -.42$), and intelligence ($r = -.05$), all ns.

This pattern was strongly reversed in the anticipated public condition, which yielded a consistent pattern of positive correlations. This indicated that, in contrast to the private condition, participants judged the target in a manner consistent with how they felt about the group as a whole. This was especially true for participants’ overall affective reaction ($r = .53$) and aggressiveness ($r = .53$), both $ps < .05$. Moreover, both of these correlations were significantly different from the negative correlations that emerged in the private condition, both $ps < .05$. A similar pattern arose for intelligence ($r = .44$), although this correlation did not in itself reach statistical significance ($p = .11$). Given the overall similarity of results across the three composites, one additional analyses was performed based on an average of the three judgmental composites. This analysis yielded a statistically significant positive correlation in the anticipated public condition ($r = .57$, $p = .03$) compared to a negative correlation that emerged in the private condition ($r = -.24$, ns).4

Discussion

When our participants were told that their impressions of the target would be completely confidential, their judgments were not reliably related to their overall attitudes toward Blacks as a whole and, if anything, showed a trend in the opposite direction. In contrast, participants in the anticipated public condition judged the target in a manner consistent with their attitudes toward Blacks as a whole. Thus, these findings were much more supportive of the bolstering hypothesis than either the conformity or moderation hypotheses. It is worth reiterating, moreover, that these results are not due to differences in the extent to which participants noticed the target’s race, as all participants had correctly recalled that the target was, in fact, Black.

On the one hand, these results seem rather surprising and indeed their counterintuitive nature prompted us to conduct a replication in the next experiment with a much larger sample size. Nevertheless, these results converged on the implications of at least two previous lines of research. For one thing, our failure to

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4 Formal analyses using ANOVA (based on a median split of participants’ attitudes) were not viable in this study due to low and/or uneven numbers of participants across experimental cells, with ns ranging from 7 to 4. Nevertheless, the pattern of means were compatible with the implications of the correlational analyses. Specifically, pro-Black participants tended to judge the target more favorably than anti-Black participants in the anticipated public condition, but this pattern was weaker or reversed in the private condition. Moreover, this was true for the affective composite ($M_s = 8.00$ vs 6.71 and 6.95 vs 7.06), ratings of intelligence ($M_s = 8.80$ vs 7.91 and 8.20 vs 7.35), and aggressiveness (6.32 vs 5.07 and 5.80 vs 6.19).
find significant correspondence between group attitudes and judgments of the target in the Private condition paralleled a set of null findings that Jackson et al. (1993) also found in a similar private setting. This fact is important, because it reduces the possibility that our null findings were the artificial result of some idiosyncratic aspect of our study. As for the anticipated public setting, it is worth noting that there is an older tradition of research in the cognitive dissonance paradigm that would, in fact, predict just the sorts of consistency effects we observed. As briefly noted earlier, McGuire’s (1964) work in the attitude domain suggests that in anticipation of an impending discussion with others, people may often “bolster” (i.e., invest in or focus on) their own attitudinal position due to the intrinsic pressure to defend one’s views in such situations. These sorts of effects are consistent with the implications of several experiments in the cognitive dissonance area, which have shown that people’s own attitudes can become more polarized when anticipating a debate with others (e.g., Greenwald, 1969; Jellison & Mills, 1969; Sears, Freedman, & O’Connor, 1964). Although we are not aware of any study in the stereotyping domain to show the effects of anticipated public settings on the correspondence between group attitudes and target judgments, Weigold and Schlenker (1991) recently reported a study in a nonstereotyping domain in which they found greater attitude-behavior consistency in an anticipated public than a private condition.

EXPERIMENT 2

Because we are not aware of any previous work that has explored the effects of varying judgmental context on peoples’ responses toward single Black individuals, it seemed prudent to replicate and extend the findings obtained in Experiment 1. The basic design of Experiment 2 was thus very similar to Experiment 1, with the following three exceptions. First, the sample size for this study was nearly double the size of the first study. Second, in order to test the generalizability of our effects we changed the description of the target’s academic performance so that it now represented an ambiguous (i.e., neither clearly good nor clearly bad) level of intellectual achievement. A third change concerned the way that we measured participants’ attitudes towards Blacks. Although our main concern in this article was on private vs public expressions of prejudice, a secondary goal was to address a current debate concerning modern vs so-called “old-fashioned” racism. Although some theorists (e.g., McConahay, 1986) have claimed that modern and old-fashioned racism represent distinct theoretical constructs, Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) have argued that if modern racism is somehow “different” from old-fashioned racism, then the two constructs should differ from one another in one or more theoretically meaningful and empirically demonstrable ways. Yet, very few researchers have actually measured both types of racism in the same domain in which they found greater attitude-behavior consistency in an anticipated public than a private condition.

5 The observant reader may have noted that in Experiment 1, one aspect of the target’s features were ambiguous with respect to one trait dimension (aggressiveness) but not another (intelligence). The target description used in Experiment 2 effectively eliminates this asymmetry, in that the target’s behaviors are now ambiguous with respect to both dimensions.
study, and we are not aware of even one study which has pitted measures of modern racism vs old fashioned racism in terms of their ability to predict judgments of a single Black individual. We thus measured both types of racism in Experiments 2 and 3 in order to investigate this issue.

Method

Participants and Design
White undergraduates ranging in age from 18 to 24 participated in partial fulfillment of course credit. Four participants who showed some insight into the objectives of the experiment were excluded from further analyses, leaving a total of 60 participants (28 male and 32 female) in the final set of analyses. As in Experiment 1, participants who varied in their attitudes toward Blacks were randomly assigned to conditions in which they judged a single Black individual in either a Private or an Anticipated Public setting.

Initial Testing Phase
All participants completed the initial battery of questionnaires in the context of a large classroom setting during the first week of class. In one part of the questionnaire, participants completed McConahay’s (1986) modern racism scale. Participants also completed the Marlowe-Crowne (1960) social desirability measure. We also developed a set of items that were designed to tap “old-fashioned” racism. These items, which were adapted from a set of old-fashioned racism items examined by McConahay (1986), were always included last in the questionnaire packet. Specifically, participants were given a random series of 20 statements and asked to rate each along a scale from -5 (strongly disagree) to +5 (strongly agree). Of these, 8 pertained specifically to Blacks: (I would not mind if my roommate was Black; On the whole, Black people are just as intelligent as Whites; Blacks are generally more aggressive than Whites; White people have the right to keep Black people out of their neighborhood if they want to; It is a bad idea for Blacks and Whites to marry one another; Generally speaking, I favor full racial integration between Whites and Blacks; I would prefer to live in a neighborhood with more Whites than Blacks.) In all of the analyses to follow, responses to the modern and old-fashioned racism items were recoded such that higher numbers indicate more favorable racial attitudes. These measures appeared in the following order: modern racism, social desirability, and old-fashioned racism scale. These were separated by other measures that were not of theoretical concern for the present research. (We also examined the pattern of correlations as a function of individual differences in self-monitoring [Snyder & Gangstead, 1986]. However, these analyses yielded an unstable and generally uninterpretable pattern of results and thus analyses involving this construct will not be considered further.)

Analyses on Modern and Old-Fashioned Racism Items
The data from the participants in Experiment 2 and the 125 participants from Experiment 3 are combined here in order to explore the relation between the modern and old-fashioned racism items. We first conducted a principal components analysis on the seven modern racism items and the eight old-fashioned racism items to see if two factors would emerge. We found, as did McConahay (1986), that two distinct constructs emerged from these kind of analyses. One factor accounted for 39% of the variance on which all seven of the modern racism items loaded highly (.50 or better) but did not load highly on the second factor (less than .25 in all cases). The second factor accounted for 14% of the variance on which seven out of the eight old-fashioned racism items loaded .50 or better but did not load above .25 on the first factor. (One item, White people have the right to keep Black people out of their neighborhood if they want to loaded moderately on both factors and was excluded from further analyses.) In light of these findings, we constructed two composites of participants’ attitudes toward Blacks, one based on the average of the seven modern racism items ($M = 1.80, SD = 1.22$) and the other based on the average of the seven old-fashioned items ($M = 1.91, SD = 1.98$). The reliability of
both the modern and old-fashioned racism scales was acceptable ($\alpha = .88, .83$, respectively). There was a slight tendency for people to rate Blacks more favorably on both scales if they scored high on the Marlowe–Crowne measure of social desirability than if they did not. However, the magnitude of this relation was trivial, and this was true of both the modern as well as the old-fashioned scales ($rs = .06$ and .09, respectively). Finally, McConahay (1986) has shown that although modern and old-fashioned racism items represent conceptually distinct factors, they are nevertheless moderately correlated with each other, and a similar relation emerged here ($r = .46, p < .01$).

**Target Judgment Phase**

The method and materials used in the target judgment phase were identical to those used in Experiment 1, except that the target description conveyed an ambiguous, rather than favorable, level of academic achievement. For example, the target was described as having a grade point average of 2.7 and having gotten “mostly B’s and some C’s” his most recent semester. Judgments of the target were based on the identical three composites used in Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to recall the target’s race after rendering their judgments of him. Eight participants failed to accurately recall his race; these participants were excluded from further analyses, leaving a total of 52 participants in the final set of analyses. Following their free-recall, participants were probed for suspiciousness, debriefed, and dismissed.

**Results**

**Correlational Analyses**

As in Experiment 1, the question of main interest was the pattern of correlations across the Private vs. Anticipated Public context. Data relevant to this issue are presented in Table 1. Turning first toward the Private condition, participants’ judgments of the target were, again, not consistent with their overall attitudes toward Blacks, and this was true not only across the three types of judgmental reactions but also regardless of whether attitudes were measured by the modern or old-fashioned racism scale. As can be seen on the right side of Table 1, this pattern was—just as in Experiment 1—reversed in the Anticipated Public condition, such that participants judged the target in a manner consistent with their attitudes toward Blacks. Moreover, this pattern held regardless of how attitudes were measured and generally held across the three types of judgmental composites. Overall, the pattern of correlations in the anticipated public condition was weaker for ratings of aggressiveness than for the other two composites. Although the reason for this asymmetry is unclear, it should be noted that even in this particular

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6 The low correlation between modern racism and social desirability is consistent with previous work by McConahay (1986) demonstrating the relative nonreactivity of this scale (but see Fazio et al., 1995). However, the fact that social desirability also failed to correlate with scores on the old-fashioned racism was somewhat unexpected. One possible explanation is that differences in willingness to rate minority groups negatively may involve a somewhat different aspect of social desirability than measured by the Marlowe-Crowne scale. It is also important to note that most previous attempts to compare the reactivity of modern vs old-fashioned racism scales (including McConahay, 1986, and Fazio et al., 1995) have done so by varying the race of the experimenter rather than through examining correlations with measures of social desirability. The present results suggest that further research is needed to explore the extent to which various measures of social desirability may be related in different ways to modern vs old-fashioned racism.
case the overall trend was similar to that observed for the other judgmental composites.

Given the similarity of these results across judgment type, we calculated correlations after averaging across judgmental composite for modern racism and old-fashioned racism. As can be seen at the bottom of Table 1, the two measures of racism (as well as an overall index based on an average of the two measures) yielded positive and statistically significant correlations in the anticipated public condition. Supplementary analyses revealed that in all three cases, these composite-based correlations were significantly different from the correlations that emerged in the private condition, all \( p < .05 \).

### Analysis of Variance

The effects of varying the judgmental context can be seen even more clearly through a repeated measures ANOVA, in which judgment type (affective reaction, aggressiveness, intelligence) was treated as a within-participant factor and Judgmental Context (private vs public) and Participant Attitude (pro vs anti) were treated as between participant variables. (Given the similar results across the two measures of racism, the participant attitude factor was created on the basis of a median split performed on an average of the modern and old-fashioned racism scales.)

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**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Judgmental context</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Anticipated public</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>General affective reaction</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern racism</td>
<td>-.36*</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old-fashioned racism</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern racism</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.44**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old-fashioned racism</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aggressiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern racism</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old-fashioned racism</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average judgment</strong> (collapsed over judgment type)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern racism</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.49***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old-fashioned racism</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.33*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average of modern and old-fashioned racism</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.39**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* \( p < .10 \); ** \( p < .05 \); *** \( p < .01 \), two tailed tests.
The pattern of correlations shown earlier implies a Judgemental Context Participant Attitude interaction, reflecting the fact that pro- and anti-Black participants judged the target in a manner inconsistent with their group attitudes in the Private condition, whereas this pattern was diametrically reversed in the Anticipated Public condition. This is what the data show. Collapsed over judgment type, pro-Black participants judged the target less favorably ($M = 5.40$) than anti-Black participants ($M = 6.32$) in the Private condition (an attitude-inconsistency effect), whereas this pattern was reversed in the Anticipated Public condition ($Ms = 6.26$ vs $5.91$). Moreover, as seen in Fig. 1, this pattern held across the three judgmental dimensions. This pattern was confirmed statistically by the emergence of a significant Judgemental Context Participant Attitude interaction, $F(1, 48) = 4.60$, $p < .04$, which was not contingent on judgment type, $F < 1.0$. Moreover, note that, compared to the private condition, the anticipated public instructions led pro-Black and anti-Black participants to judge the target more vs less favorably, respectively. This is precisely the sort of pattern one would expect if the anticipated public instructions were leading both types of participants to rely on their personal attitudes when forming an impression of the target.7

EXPERIMENT 3

A third study was necessary in order to assess the boundary conditions of the effects demonstrated in Experiments 1 and 2 as well as test an alternative interpretation of these findings. According to the interpretation we have advanced so far, people in anticipated public settings “bolster” or focus on their own attitudinal position. This suggests that they would not be motivated to shift their judgments of the target to the likely views of the audience. It is possible, however, that the results obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 reflected a type of conformity effect. A crucial assumption of this alternative account is that when participants are not given information about the prospective audience, they tend to assume that others hold attitudes similar to the self. In light of research on the “false consensus” effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; Marks & Miller, 1987; see also Lambert & Wedell, 1991), it is possible that pro-Black and anti-Black participants perceived that the audience held attitudes roughly similar to their own. To this extent, participants in the anticipated public condition may have felt more comfortable expressing their own racial attitudes when rendering their ratings of the target person. Two testable implications arise out of this alternative account. First, in the absence of information about the audience, pro-Black participants

7 In some of our research we have also run participants in conditions in which their attitudes towards Blacks were primed just before they formed an impression of the target. We find that such manipulations increase the consistency between group attitudes and judgments of the target in private contexts but have little effect in anticipated public contexts. Such findings are consistent with our perspective, developed later in this article, that people’s attitudes are relatively inaccessible in private contexts (unless, of course, these attitudes have recently been primed), whereas these attitudes tend to be more accessible in public contexts regardless of whether these attitudes have been recently primed or not.
Fig. 1. Judgments of the target as a function of Judgmental Context (private vs. anticipated public) and Participant Attitude (pro-Black vs anti-Black) across the affective reaction, aggressiveness, and intelligence composites: Experiment 2. In all cases, scale ranges from 0 to 10, with higher numbers indicating more favorable ratings of the target.
should perceive that these persons are relatively “pro” but anti-Black participants should infer that they are more “anti” (i.e., an assumed similarity effect). More important, when participants are given information about the likely views of the audience, the consistency between own attitudes and judgments of the target should completely disappear and all participants should simply shift their judgments of the target in either a “pro” or “anti” direction, depending on what they were told about the audience.

We explored the merits of this alternative account in Experiment 3 by manipulating whether participants did or did not receive explicit information about the views of the audience just prior to receiving information about the target person. In particular, participants (a) were told nothing about the likely views of the prospective audience (as was the case in Experiments 1 and 2), (b) were informed that the prospective audience had relatively favorable racial attitudes (Positive Context), or (c) were informed that these attitudes were relatively unfavorable (Negative Context). This manipulation was expected to provide important leverage in teasing apart the validity of the two hypotheses articulated above. According to the first, “bolstering” account, there should be little evidence of any conformity effects, and consistency effects should prevail not only in the No Information context, but in the Positive and Negative Contexts as well. In contrast, the conformity account suggests that such consistency should emerge only in the No Information condition.

Method

Participants and Design

White undergraduates ranging in age from 18 to 23 participated in partial fulfillment of course credit. Three participants were excluded who expressed some insight into the nature of the experiment, leaving a total of 125 participants (54 male, 71 female). All participants were assigned to an Anticipated Public condition. However, the nature of the information they received prior to receiving information about the target person (No Information, Positive, Negative Context) was varied.

Procedure

The procedure of Experiment 3 was similar to that of Experiments 1 and 2 with only two exceptions. The first change concerned what kind of information participants received immediately before receiving information about the target. One third of the participants were given no additional information at all, and thus this condition was identical to that of the Anticipated Public conditions in Experiments 1 and 2. The other participants were provided with a single page immediately before the biographical sketch which provided information suggesting that Washington University students had either relatively favorable or unfavorable views about Blacks. This information read as follows (manipulation of wording across condition is indicated by the words in bold type):

In previous research, we have found that participants usually find it helpful to know some relevant information about the attitudes and beliefs of other students prior to engaging in discussion sessions with them. As you will see shortly, the particular person that you will be judging today is African American. You should be aware that in a study conducted by the Sociology department, 71% of students at Washington University were found to have more favorable [unfavorable] opinions towards Blacks and were more [less] sympathetic with the concerns of this group compared to national norms collected at other universities. A
very similar percentage (74%) was obtained in a more recent study conducted in 1992. Of course, this does not mean that everyone has the same attitude, but this represents the overall percentage or distribution of beliefs and attitudes toward this group.

Following the presentation of this information, all participants were provided with the same biographical sketch, target information, and judgment forms that were used in Experiment 2. The same judgmental composites used in the earlier experiments were used here as well. Following their judgments of the target participants were again asked to recall the race of the target. Four participants (all in the No Information condition) failed to correctly recall the target’s race and were excluded from further analyses, leaving a total of 121 participants in the analyses to be reported below. At the completion of the study, all participants were given a full educational debriefing and dismissed.

Estimates of other participants’ attitudes toward Blacks. After judging the target, all participants provided estimates of the attitudes of the prospective audience. One question concerned participants’ direct comparisons of their own attitudes relative to the other participants in the room in which they were asked, If you had to guess, how would you generally compare the attitudes of the other participants in this room today to your OWN attitudes towards Blacks and other minorities? Participants responded to this query along a scale ranging from −5 (their views are much more unfavorable than my own) to +5 (their views are much more favorable than my own). Although the preceding question provides information about participants’ perceptions of how their own attitudes compared to the other persons in the room, it was also important to assess participants’ estimates of the average attitudes of the other participants in the room. To this end, participants estimated the average attitude of these persons with respect to Blacks along a scale that ranged from −5 (extremely negative) to +5 (extremely positive). After making these judgments, participants were then provided with the same question (on a separate page) in which they were asked to make estimates about the average attitudes of “Washington University undergraduates as a whole.” Because the two sets of ratings were highly correlated with one another ($r = .78$, $p < .001$), analyses were based on an average of these two measures.

Results

Preliminary analyses again revealed a similar pattern of results, regardless of whether attitudes toward Blacks was measured by the modern vs old-fashioned racism scales. Thus, in the main analyses to be presented below, group attitudes are based on an average of the two scales.

Manipulation Check

A critical aspect of this experiment concerns whether we successfully manipulated participants’ perceptions of the average attitudes of the other participants. This was in fact the case. Participants estimated the audience to be most “pro” in the Positive context ($M = 1.58$), less so in the No Information Context ($M = 1.36$), with the lowest ratings in the Negative Context ($M = .06$), $F(2, 115) = 8.17$, $p < .001$. Further analyses indicated that this manipulation was effective for both pro-Black participants ($Ms = 1.76$ vs $1.70$ vs $1.18$) as well as anti-Black participants ($Ms = 1.44$ vs $1.88$ vs $1.05$) for the Positive, No Information, and Negative Contexts, respectively. Closer inspection of these means also reveals a slight assumed similarity effect. That is, in each of these conditions, pro-Black participants tended to perceive others as slightly more favorable in their attitudes towards Blacks than the anti-Black participants. However, this effect was not reliable, $F < 1.0$.

The weak assumed similarity effects noted above suggest that participants had
insight into how their own racial attitudes compared to those held by other undergraduates. Recall that the “social comparison” question was worded such that higher numbers indicated the perception that others had more favorable attitudes than the self. In addition, note that anti-Black participants have—by definition—attitudes that are more negative compared to the average undergraduate in our sample whereas the reverse is true of pro-Black participants. If participants have insight into this matter, ratings on this scale should be higher for anti-Black than for pro-Black participants. This is what the data show. Anti-Black participants (correctly) perceived that the other people in the room were likely to have more favorable attitudes than their own whereas the reverse was true for pro-Black participants, and this was true in both the No Information ($M_s = .19 \text{ vs } -.39$), Positive ($M_s = .13 \text{ vs } -.47$) and Negative ($M_s = -.68 \text{ vs } -1.15$) contexts, $F(1, 115) = 5.674, p = .02$, for the main effect for group attitude. This effect was not contingent on judgmental context, $p > .15$.

Judgments of the Target

Analyses of the target as a function of participant attitude and judgmental context was expected to resolve two alternative interpretations of the findings obtained in Experiments 1 and 2. According to the first, “bolstering” account, there should be little evidence of any conformity effects whereas the “assumed similarity” account suggests that such consistency should emerge only in the No Information condition, with conformity effects more likely in the other two judgmental contexts. The pattern of results showed considerably more support for the bolstering account. This fact is most easily seen by the results of a mixed-model repeated measures ANOVA, in which Judgmental Context (No Information, Positive, Negative) and Participant Attitude (Pro vs Anti) were treated as between-subjects factors and judgment type (affective reaction, intelligence, and aggressiveness) was treated as a within-subject factor. Analyses revealed only one significant effect. Specifically, pro-Black participants judged the target more favorably than anti-Black participants ($M_s = 6.38 \text{ vs } 5.99$), $F(1, 115) = 5.00, p = .027$, for the main effect of participant attitude. Moreover, this difference held across the three levels of judgmental context, although the magnitude of the difference was nonsignificantly larger in the No Information ($M_s = 6.44 \text{ vs } 5.78$) and Positive Context ($M_s = 6.47 \text{ vs } 6.01$) than the Negative Context ($M_s = 6.22 \text{ vs } 6.14$). This pattern was confirmed statistically by the fact that judgmental context had no effects at all either on its own ($F = .36$) or in combination with participant attitude ($F = 1.10$). Nor did judgment type have any effects either on its own or in combination with group attitude or judgmental context, all $F_s < 1.0$.

A more fine-grained test. A more sensitive test of the mediating effects of the audience on participants’ judgments of the target can be seen through two sets of correlational analyses. First, collapsing over the three levels of judgmental context, we correlated participants’ attitudes toward Blacks with their judgments of the target, both before and after partialling out participants’ perceptions of the racial reviews of the audience. Our framework suggests that this partialling

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procedure should not have any effects whatsoever, and this was in fact the case (zero vs partial $r_s = .24$ vs .25, $p < .01$). A different analytic technique is to collapse over participants' attitudes toward Blacks and simply correlate judgments of the target with participants' perceptions of the audience. Evidence for a conformity effect would emerge via a positive correlation between target judgments and the perceived attitudes of the audience, indicating that the more favorable these perceived attitudes, the more favorable their judgments of the target and vice versa. As suggested by the preceding analyses, there was no reliable relation between the perceived racial views of the audience and how participants judged the target, $r = .13$, ns. Thus, the effects of participants' attitudes on judgments of the target were not mediated in any way whatsoever by the perceived views of the audience.

Unique Effects of Modern vs Old-Fashioned Racism

Collapsed over all judgmental conditions, the correlations between own attitudes and judgments of the target was about the same regardless of whether attitudes were measured by old-fashioned or modern racism ($r_s = .24$ vs .16). Given the close parallel in the pattern of results across two experiments, it seemed possible that the two scales are essentially measuring the same thing (most likely, anti-Black affect). (For a related argument, see Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). If this line of reasoning is correct, then partialing out old-fashioned racism from modern racism should substantially reduce the effects of modern racism, because partialling old-fashioned racism is removing a portion of an underlying construct (anti-Black affect) driving reactions to the target. Of course, the opposite should be true as well: partialling out modern racism from old-fashioned racism should reduce the effects of old-fashioned racism. This is what the data show. Collapsed over all conditions, the zero order correlation between modern racism and judgments of the target was substantially reduced once old-fashioned racism was partialled out (zero vs partial $r_s = .16$ vs .05). An analogous set of analyses emerged from the old-fashioned racism measure (zero vs partial $r_s = .24$ vs .18) although in this case the latter, partial correlation was still significant, $p < .05$.

Further implications of these analyses will be addressed under General Discussion.

Discussion

Taken as a whole, the results from Experiments 1–3 converge nicely with the implications of research in the cognitive dissonance paradigm, which shows that anticipated debates can sometimes lead people to bolster or solidify their attitudinal position compared to more private conditions (Greenwald, 1969; Jellison & Mills, 1969; Sears et al., 1964). It is important to note that this earlier work has shown that the likelihood of bolstering effects arising appears to be moderated by peoples’ a priori commitment to their attitudinal position. Although bolstering effects are common when people are committed to their attitude,
conformity is more frequent when commitment is low (Apsler & Sears, 1968). The lack of conformity in Experiment 3 suggests that both pro-Black and anti-Black participants are at least moderately committed to their racial attitudes.

In order to establish more direct evidence for this assumption, we conducted a supplementary study on a separate group of participants (N = 25) in which we measured individual differences in old-fashioned and modern racism and, 2 months later, measured the extent to which participants were committed to their attitudes toward Blacks. Commitment was measured using a four-item scale developed by Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, and Elliot (1991), in which participants were asked to respond to a statement (e.g., How important is it to you to respond towards blacks in ways that are consistent with your personal standards?) along a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). Although previous work with this scale has shown that pro-Black individuals tend to be more committed to their attitudes than anti-Black individuals (Devine et al., 1991), this work only reported the correlation between racial attitudes and commitment, but not the average level of commitment among pro-Black and anti-Black participants. Our research suggests that both groups are above a critical threshold of commitment and that this may have led all participants to judge the target in a manner reasonably consistent with their attitudes, regardless of the ostensible views of the audience.

Replicating earlier results obtained by Devine et al. (1991), we found a significant correlation between racial attitudes (based on an average of scores on the modern and old-fashioned racism scales) and commitment to their beliefs about Blacks, r = .40, p < .05. More illuminating, however, were the results of the ANOVAs. As implied by the correlational analyses, pro-Black participants were, on the one hand, more committed to their attitudes than anti-Black participants (Ms = 8.88 vs 7.65), F(1, 23) = 5.27, p < .05. Nevertheless, the fact that ratings by anti-Black participants were well above the midpoint of the scale suggests that these latter individuals were certainly not uncommitted to their racial attitudes. Indeed, they might more appropriately be regarded as showing a moderately high commitment to their views in comparison to pro-Black participants, whose level of commitment was extremely high.

It is worth noting at this point that factors other than attitudinal commitment have been shown to moderate the extent to which people show bolstering effects. For example, Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger (1989) recently found evidence for bolstering when the experimenters measured participants’ own attitude prior to the anticipated public instructions but conformity if these attitudes were not measured beforehand. This suggests that the likelihood of bolstering can be driven both by the intrinsic, a priori commitment to the attitude as well as by its temporary salience. This raises a more general issue. Because different kinds of attitudes are likely to be associated with different levels of commitment, it may well be the case that there are certain attitudinal domains which are more likely to produce conformity effects than others. Thus, the findings obtained in one domain
should not necessarily generalize to another. It could well be the case that, given the growing importance of racial issues on university campuses, attitudes toward Blacks may now generally represent an issue toward which people have developed a reasonably high level of attitudinal commitment compared to other issues, although future work is obviously needed to explore these considerations more directly.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

This is the first program of research known to us that directly compared the different processes that might mediate reactions to single Black individuals in private vs anticipated public conditions. The present research yielded several replicable and theoretically provocative findings, which may be summarized as follows:

1. Experiments 1 and 2 each showed that when participants were not given any information about the likely views of the audience, judgments of a single Black individual were more consistent with racial attitudes in an anticipated public than in a private condition. Moreover, similar results were obtained in Experiment 3 when participants were, in fact, given information about the likely views of the audience. These effects replicate previous findings by Weigold and Schlenker (1991) which were obtained in a nonstereotyping domain and, more generally, are consistent with the implications of an older line of research in the dissonance paradigm, which had shown that anticipated public instructions lead people to focus on or “invest” in their own position (e.g., Apsler & Sears, 1968; Greenwald, 1969).

2. Although modern and old-fashioned scale items loaded on different factors, these scales were significantly correlated with one another and these two measures were related in very similar, if not identical, ways to judgments of the target. More important, partialling out differences in old-fashioned racism reduced the effects of modern racism (and vice versa), and there was little evidence there was anything about modern racism that was especially distinct from old-fashioned racism, at least in terms of its ability to predict how people respond to a single Black individual in public contexts.

Experiment 3 (as well as the supplementary data reported in the context of that study) indicated that all participants were at least moderately committed to their racial attitudes. Although this provides a clearer basis for understanding the implications of the present research, it raises an interesting question. If attitudinal commitment was so high, then why did we obtain little relation between these attitudes and judgments of the target in a private setting? One possible answer concerns distinguishing commitment from accessibility. Although commitment and accessibility are probably correlated, they are not the same. Indeed, one can easily think of many attitudes toward which one is relatively committed (e.g., protecting the environment), but the extent to which these attitudes are accessible (and the degree to which our behaviors are consistent with them) may vary
considerably across situations. Conversely, it is also possible that one can have a highly accessible attitude (e.g., toward the merits of pistachio ice cream) and not be particularly committed to it.

In the present research, this suggests that although our participants may have been generally committed in their racial attitudes, these attitudes may still have been relatively inaccessible in the private condition and, hence, had little effect on the way they judged the target. In this regard, it is worth noting that our manipulation of the target’s race was reasonably subtle and, in proportion to the wealth of other information about him, constituted a relatively minor aspect of his attributes. Thus, even though participants were relatively committed to their attitudes, it is still entirely possible that these attitudes were relatively inaccessible in the private condition and the low consistency between own attitudes and judgments of the target we (as well as Jackson et al., 1993) obtained in such settings is consistent with this premise. Nevertheless, our evidence for attitude accessibility is indirect and future research is clearly needed to examine the link between private vs. anticipated public settings and the accessibility of attitudes through the use of more direct measures of accessibility, such as response time measures (e.g., Fazio & Williams, 1986).

Implications for Previous Research in the Stereotyping Literature

Further empirical support for the implications of our findings arises from a consideration of a recent experiment by Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Susser (1994; Experiment 4), which, to our knowledge, is the only other stereotyping experiment to rely on an anticipated public manipulation similar to the one employed here. In that aspect of the experiment most germane to present concerns, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) asked participants to form an impression of an Hispanic individual who had been accused of assault in either a private or an anticipated public setting.8 Bodenhausen et al. (1994) found that judgments of guilt were actually more harsh when the Hispanic target was judged under an accountability set compared to a nonaccountability set. One ambiguity surrounding these data is that these researchers did not assess differences in participants’ attitudes toward Hispanics. However, Bodenhausen et al. (1994) reported that most of their participant population personally endorsed the belief that Hispanics are relatively aggressive compared to Whites. To this extent, these results are consistent with the conceptualization offered in the present article. That is, to the extent that the accountability manipulation increased participants’ focus on their (generally negative) attitudes about Hispanics, this would explain why the

8 The main purpose of the Bodenhausen et al. (1994) was on the effects of happy moods in the use vs disuse of stereotypes. However, our main concern in this study was on the effects of judgmental context in the absence of mood manipulations and thus we focus only on those results that emerged from the neutral mood conditions.
defendant was judged more guilty when they expected to justify their impressions of him than if they did not. 9

Modern vs “Old-Fashioned” Racism

Are the present results consistent with the tenets of modern racism? This depends on one’s interpretation of the modern racism scale and what it supposedly represents. Unfortunately, there appears to be some confusion in what exactly, modern racism is. On the one hand, McConahay (1986) has stated

That was why the [modern racism] items were developed: to create valid, nonreactive measures of antiblack prejudice. (McConahay, 1986, p. 97)

We believe that our results support this particular view of modern racism. In particular, the effects of modern racism were substantially reduced by partialling out a measure that directly tapped racist attitudes, our “old-fashioned” racism scale. This is by no means inconsistent with McConahay’s model as defined here. Indeed, this is exactly what one should expect if modern racism is meant to be a measure of racist attitudes. On the other hand, McConahay (1986) also claims, somewhat confusingly, that modern racism represents an entirely new form of racism. We are less sure about this second view. Although factor analyses did show that modern and old-fashioned racism items loaded on separate factors, the problem is that the effects of modern racism on judgments of the target person were virtually identical to the effects of old-fashioned racism. On this account, we are much more in agreement with Sniderman and Tetlock (1986), who argue that there is very little evidence to support the contention that modern and old-fashioned racism are fundamentally different.

In addition to these potential problems with the modern racism scale, there have been some recent criticisms of its ability to predict reactions toward Blacks in methodological paradigms quite different from that employed in the present research. For example, some researchers have found that the modern racism scale is not correlated with individual differences in the extent to which people’s racial attitudes are automatically activated following subtle activation of the category of Blacks (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995). It should be noted, however, that other researchers (e.g., Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, in press) have found that the modern racism scale is, in fact, predictive of such effects, although the methodologies of the Wittenbrink et al. (in press) and Fazio et al. (1995) studies are different in some

9 Dutton and Yee (1974) also examined the effects of varying situational context on judgments of single Asian targets. However, the results of that study (which showed conformity effects) are difficult to compare to the present paradigm. In particular, participants in Dutton and Yee (1974) were not given any indication that they would be discussing their judgments with the other participants in the room. This is in contrast to our methodology, in which participants were explicitly told that such a discussion would, in fact, take place. This could explain why Dutton and Yee (1974) found evidence for conformity, whereas we did not. In other words, it seems reasonable to suppose that own attitudes may play a greater role in guiding judgments in public settings if participants are given opportunity to voice support for and justify their attitudes than if they are not.
important respects. In any event, these investigations obviously suggest that further research is needed to investigate more closely the validity of the modern racism scale across different types of social judgments and methodological paradigms.

**Some Caveats and Directions for Future Research**

Although the manipulation employed in Experiment 3 had a significant effect on participants’ views of the audience, the observant reader may have already noted that the absolute magnitude of these effects were not particularly large. It could be argued that we would have obtained stronger conformity effects if a more powerful manipulation of these expectations had been used instead. For example, it could be that conformity effects might be more likely when people anticipate interacting with a single individual who is ostensibly either pro-Black or anti-Black in their views using variations on the “Bogus Stranger” paradigm (Clore & Byrne, 1974). We are currently exploring this possibility.

Another direction for future research concerns the mechanisms underlying the effects we obtained in anticipated public contexts. According to our framework, the anticipated public condition increases the likelihood that people bolster their own attitudes through the generation of arguments supporting their own ideological position. Alternatively, it is possible that the effects of the anticipated public manipulation arise out of shifts in attentional focus. Scheier and Carver (1988) have demonstrated that increases in self-focus are associated with greater attitude-behavior consistency. To this extent, the effect of our anticipated public manipulations may well have been mediated by self-consciousness. It should be noted, however, that Scheier and Carver distinguish between private and public self-consciousness (but see Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987 for a dissenting view) and they have shown that increases in *private*, not public, self-consciousness appear to mediate greater consistency in attitudes and behavior (Froming & Carver, 1981). Indeed, this research has shown that higher levels of public self-consciousness are associated with greater conformity. In order to explain the present findings, therefore, it would be necessary to argue that the anticipated public condition is having a greater effect on private than on public self-consciousness, which seems possible but unlikely. In light of these considerations, our view is that the “bolstering” hypothesis seems best able to account for our data but obviously more direct measures of this process are needed to further validate this explanation.

**A Final Note**

The present research shares some important similarities with a rapidly growing body of research on the processes by which people express or suppress prejudicial responses toward minority groups and the boundary conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to occur (Devine, 1989; Lambert, Khan, Lickel, & Fricke, in press; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Wegner, 1994; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). These and other related findings suggest that an important goal of
future work is to develop more general models of stereotype activation and inhibition that take into account not only the role of judgmental context but other motivational and cognitive factors as well.

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